# U.S. Oil & Refining Co.

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U.S. Oil & Refining Co. 3001 Marshall Avenue Tacoma, Washington 98421 Tel: (253) 383-1651 Web: www.usor.com

July 15, 2022

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Mr. Joshua Grice Air Quality Program Department of Ecology State of Washington P.O. Box 47600 Olympia, WA 98504-7600

### Re: U.S. Oil and Refining Company Comments and Recommendations on Chapter WAC 173-446 Rulemaking, Climate Commitment Act (CCA) Program

Dear Mr. Grice,

Thank you for the opportunity to share our comments and concerns regarding the Climate Commitment Program and WAC 173-446 rulemaking.

U.S. Oil and Refining Company (USOR) has been a local supplier of high-quality clean fuels since the 1950s. USOR began as a family-owned enterprise and remains focused on the needs of the local market. We are the smallest, the least complex, and the lowest GHG emitting refinery in the State of Washington, as well as the only producer of 100% recyclable asphalt in the region.

Despite our small size, USOR's configuration and investments over the years to improve efficiency have resulted in operations with significantly less direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per barrel of fuel produced than our peers, especially since the vast majority of what we produce is delivered within the region. And USOR's performance in terms of MT of CO2e emitted per barrel of crude oil processed is among the best in its class nationally. We have been a proud neighbor and member of the community in Tacoma for decades, and our values reflect who we are, and where we live and work.

However, as a small downstream enterprise focused on the needs of the local community, we don't have large planning or trading departments or the ability to quickly deploy significant capital. Thus, while we believe we can continue to play an important role in Washington's energy future, the prospect of complying with a new program like WAC 173-446 requires significant planning and program certainty given our investment capabilities.

It is with these realities in mind that we provide three main comments. First, we are concerned about the structure of the program and the potentially high cost of compliance. Second, we are concerned that we lack the information to appropriately model and plan for the costs of WAC 173-446. Finally, we have



concerns regarding the benchmarking process. Please note we also endorse the comments submitted by the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA).

At a macro level, we are concerned about the potentially high cost of compliance for ourselves and consumers of transportation fuels in Washington. If the market contemplated by the program does not operate as assumed, or if credit prices quickly hit the ceiling as modeled by NERA (see attached), we are likely to be disproportionately harmed by our small size. To address this challenge, at least in the first compliance period, we believe the credit ceiling price should be set at a lower value (e.g., \$20, in line with the floor price and the credit value assumed in the legislature's fiscal analysis of the rule). This is particularly important for a niche refinery like USOR since costs associated with this program will compete with future capital investments to advance the energy transition, such as our "Next Gen" renewable fuel logistics project or our desire to participate in the development of a green hydrogen hub in Washington.

We also require greater transparency in the fuels sector allowances. As a supplier focused on the local community, a large percentage of our production will be subject to the rule, representing a significant business expense. The compliance costs forecast by third-party models we have reviewed (e.g., NERA, WRC) differ substantially from data provided by the Department of Ecology, which makes planning difficult. In particular, we are concerned that the dataset used by Ecology to establish the baseline for Transportation Fuels (i.e., Transportation Fuel Supplier Reporting, which includes fuels that are taxed in WA) may not be consistent or aligned with the data required by the rule for reporting which follow Subpart MM reporting under WAC 173-446. Even if these two datasets align at the macro level (e.g., total emissions across the sector), inconsistencies at the micro level will impact facility-specific compliance requirements. To be successfully compliant, we need the raw data and methodology Ecology is using to calculate the baseline and clarity on what to report. Without both, there will be uncertainty regarding which fuels will be required to be reported and covered with credits.

An example is how asphalt is treated in the rule. We agree with the clear statement in the rule that asphalt is exempt. Asphalt is neither combusted nor oxidized as a fuel and effectively sequesters carbon in a 100% recyclable product. Asphalt originating from USOR effectively sequesters 1.2 million MT of CO2e annually that otherwise would be converted into fuels. For this reason, USOR should receive credits or otherwise benefit from the carbon-reduction its asphalt production provides.

Lastly, we would like to offer support for sector – rather than individual facility - benchmarking, which would be consistent with other jurisdictions (i.e., California) and make the program both fairer and more effective. The program is designed to reduce GHG emissions, and sector benchmarking would benefit facilities with low GHG emissions. Paradoxically, and contrary to the spirit of the regulation, facility-level benchmarking gives the worst-emitting facilities the most reduction capacity and easiest path toward future compliance. Facilities like USOR that have prioritized and invested in emissions reduction may not be able to practicably further reduce emissions without idling units or shutting down with the net effect of more emissions



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While a shift to sector benchmarking may not be possible without legislative action, Ecology can improve the rule now by eliminating the unnecessarily restrictive requirement that three consecutive years are required to establish an alternative baseline. Additionally, as noted by WSPA, the rule adds restrictions on when an EITE facility using Best Available Technology (BAT) may request an increase in its benchmark for direct emissions. The rule includes a two-part test that requires evidence of internal process change and an external threat, but fails to acknowledge that external threats are always present and it is unclear what constitutes an external threat under this rule. The rule also does not define how BAT would be determined. We suggest that an independent third-party source like the Energy Intensity Index (EII) published by Solomon be used to establishing BAT for USOR. For our company, understanding how BAT will be determined is important now because we may need to invest significant capital and design effort to make changes prior to the second compliance period, when it will be required by the rule. Planning has already started on our next turnaround, when any such facility modifications would take plan.

USOR has operated on the shores of Commencement Bay since 1952 and we have been a communityoriented operation throughout our history. We have long understood and embraced the expectations of our community to be aware of and respect the environment where we work alongside people who are our friends and neighbors. By design – and reflected in what we have invested without being required by rule – USOR has the lowest carbon intensity of the five refineries in Washington and is among the best in its class nationally. We are a proud local supplier and thus our environmental values both help sustain and are supported by the local economy. However, as currently drafted, WAC 173-446 disadvantages USOR relative to its larger peers.

Because of our size, because we have historically prioritized and invested in low emissions, and because we do not benefit from the resources of global refining operations, the rules threaten our ability to be compliant and competitive without reducing supply. We believe that it is a benefit to the local community and consistent with the spirit of the rules for USOR, as the lowest emitting refinery in Washington, to remain active in the market during this period of energy transition.

Please accept these comments with our sincerest thanks for your consideration, and do not hesitate to reach out to me with any questions. We look forward to continuing to work together.

Respectfully submitted,

Andrew Troske Refinery Manager, U.S. Oil & Refining Company

# Assessing Value of Adding Flexibility to Washington State's Greenhouse Gas "Cap and Invest" Program



Prepared for:

Western States Petroleum Association

June 2022

### About NERA

NERA Economic Consulting (www.nera.com) is a global firm of experts dedicated to applying economic, finance, and quantitative principles to complex business and legal challenges. For over half a century, NERA's economists have been creating strategies, studies, reports, expert testimony, and policy recommendations for government authorities and the world's leading law firms and corporations. We bring academic rigor, objectivity, and real-world industry experience to bear on issues arising from competition, regulation, public policy, strategy, finance, and litigation.

These research insights reflect the research, opinions, and conclusions of the study author (Dr. Sugandha Tuladhar. Ph.D., Associate Director, NERA Economic Consulting) and does not necessarily reflect those of NERA Economic Consulting, its affiliated companies, or any other organization.

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## **OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY**

As part of the Washington Climate Commitment Act, the State's Senate Bill SB 5126 would establish a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and invest program to be implemented by the Washington State Department of Ecology. The bill was signed by Governor Jay Inslee on May 17, 2021. The Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) retained NERA Economic Consulting to develop a model that represents the Washington state economy using its N<sub>ew</sub>ERA modeling system and to use it to develop estimates of the economic impact benefits of adding provisions for greater flexibility into the bill. This document presents results for one specific form of such flexibility: allowing for linkage between Washington's and Western Climate Initiative's (WCI) climate program which comprises of California and Quebec.

This research study represents an analysis of the targets and some of the proposed measures in the bill. The measures accounted for in this analysis include the imposition of an emission cap with tradeable allowances, no-cost and direct allowance allocations, offsets credits, and allowances set aside in containment reserves. For the scenario where linkage is allowed between Washington's and WCI's climate program, two bounding cases were run – the first assumes a fully optimal forward looking rational behavior on the part of consumers and producers and the second assumes a myopic behavior on the part of consumers to capture market expectations about the uncertainties surrounding California's GHG policy in the short run.<sup>1</sup> Some of the key research insights are presented below with the results for the two linked scenarios presented in Table 1 while the results for the unlinked scenario are presented in Table 2:

- The economic costs to Washington households in the linked program with access to "speed bumps" is projected to be lower in 2024 than in the scenario without "speed bumps." On average from 2024 to 2030, the economic costs to Washington households are projected to be on average about 1.3 times greater under the unlinked program than under the linked program both with and without "speed bumps". The average annual costs per household in Washington is projected to be about \$930 both with and without "speed bumps" and about \$1,170 without linkage over the 2024 to 2030 time period.<sup>2</sup>
- In an unlinked program, without a price ceiling, the allowance prices are projected to increase to about \$185 and \$250 in 2024 and 2030, respectively, to achieve the state's emissions goals. When the two programs are linked, Washington's allowance prices are projected to approach California's allowance ceiling prices of about \$77 in 2024 and \$103 in 2030. This result is due to the relative stringency of Washington's program and the additional demand for allowances from the WCI allowance market. If Washington links to the WCI program, it is projected to be a net importer of permits within the linked program. In the linked case with "speed bumps", Washington's allowance prices are projected to be about \$49 in 2024 while they are projected to approach California's allowance ceiling prices by 2030. The lower allowance price in 2024 is a consequence of an adequate amount of allowances being available such that the allowance price would remain at the "speed bump" price in 2024.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Speed Bumps" refer to price containment points between the price floor and the price ceiling at which a certain amount of allowances from the allowance price containment reserve (APCR) are made available.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> All values are denominated in 2021 dollars.

• The average cost of compliance for motor gasoline and diesel with linkage to the WCI program is projected to be about \$0.67 and \$0.77 per gallon respectively over the 2024 to 2030 time period while they are projected to be about \$0.60 and \$0.69 per gallon respectively in the linked case with "speed bumps" over the same period. The average cost of compliance for motor gasoline and diesel respectively in the without linkage program with no ceiling price is projected to be about \$1.61 and \$1.83 per gallon over the 2024 to 2030 time period.

### Table 1: Summary of Key Results (With WCI Linkage)

With WCI Linkage (and "Speed Bumps")				With WCI Linkage			
			Average				Average
2024	2027	2030	Annual	2024	2027	2030	Annual
			(2024-2030)				(2024-2030)
\$810	\$970	\$1,020	\$930	\$870	\$920	\$1,000	\$930
\$0.37	\$0.67	\$0.77	\$0.60	\$0.58	\$0.67	\$0.77	\$0.67
\$0.42	\$0.76	\$0.88	\$0.69	\$0.66	\$0.77	\$0.88	\$0.77
-3%	-4%	-5%	-4%	-3%	-4%	-5%	-4%
\$49	\$90	\$103		\$77	\$90	\$103	
\$21	\$24	\$28		\$21	\$24	\$28	
	2024 \$810 \$0.37 \$0.42 -3% \$49 \$21	2024         2027           \$810         \$970           \$0.37         \$0.67           \$0.42         \$0.76           -3%         -4%           \$49         \$90           \$21         \$24	Bumps")           2024         2027         2030           \$810         \$970         \$1,020           \$0.37         \$0.67         \$0.77           \$0.42         \$0.76         \$0.88           -3%         -4%         -5%           \$49         \$90         \$103           \$21         \$24         \$28	Bumps")           2024         2027         2030         Annual (2024-2030)           \$810         \$970         \$1,020         \$930           \$0.37         \$0.67         \$0.77         \$0.60           \$0.42         \$0.76         \$0.88         \$0.69           -3%         -4%         -5%         -4%           \$49         \$90         \$103           \$21         \$24         \$28	Bumps")           2024         2027         2030         Average Annual (2024-2030)         2024           \$810         \$970         \$1,020         \$930         \$870           \$0.37         \$0.67         \$0.77         \$0.60         \$0.58           \$0.42         \$0.76         \$0.88         \$0.69         \$0.66           -3%         -4%         -5%         -4%         -3%           \$49         \$90         \$103         \$77           \$21         \$24         \$28         \$21	Bumps")         Average           2024         2027         2030         Annual (2024-2030)         2024         2027           \$810         \$970         \$1,020         \$930         \$870         \$920           \$0.37         \$0.67         \$0.77         \$0.60         \$0.58         \$0.67           \$0.42         \$0.76         \$0.88         \$0.69         \$0.66         \$0.77           -3%         -4%         -5%         -4%         -3%         -4%           \$49         \$90         \$103         \$77         \$90           \$21         \$24         \$28         \$21         \$24	Bumps")         Average Annual (2024-2030)         2024         2027         2030         Annual (2024-2030)         2024         2027         2030           \$810         \$970         \$1,020         \$930         \$870         \$920         \$1,000           \$0.37         \$0.67         \$0.77         \$0.60         \$0.58         \$0.67         \$0.77           \$0.42         \$0.76         \$0.88         \$0.69         \$0.66         \$0.77         \$0.88           -3%         -4%         -5%         -4%         -3%         -4%         -5%           \$49         \$90         \$103         \$77         \$90         \$103           \$21         \$24         \$28         \$21         \$24         \$28

\*Fiscal Note Summary (12 May 2021)

### Table 2: Summary of Key Results (Without WCI Linkage and No Ceiling Price)

	Without WCI Linkage and No Ceiling Price					
	2024	2027	2030	Average Annual (2024-2030)		
Loss in Annual Consumption per Household (2021\$/HH) <sup>5</sup>	\$1,110	\$1,130	\$1,260	\$1,170		
Cost of Compliance of Motor Gasoline (2021\$/gal)	\$1.38	\$1.60	\$1.84	\$1.61		
Cost of Compliance of Diesel (2021\$/gal)	\$1.58	\$1.83	\$2.10	\$1.83		
Loss in Output of Energy-Intensive Sectors (%) <sup>6</sup>	-4%	-6%	-7%	-6%		
Allowance Price (2021\$/MT CO <sub>2</sub> )	\$184	\$214	\$246			
Allowance Floor Price (2021\$/MT CO <sub>2</sub> )*	\$21	\$24	\$28			

\*Fiscal Note Summary (12 May 2021)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This metric measures the impacts to an average Washington household's annual personal consumption expenditure (in terms of current spending).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This metric measures the change in quantity of production of the aggregate energy-intensive sector (which comprises pulp and paper, chemicals, glass, cement, iron and steel, alumina and aluminum and mining).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This metric measures the impacts to an average Washington household's annual personal consumption expenditure (in terms of current spending).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This metric measures the change in quantity of production of the aggregate energy-intensive sector (which comprises pulp and paper, chemicals, glass, cement, iron and steel, alumina and aluminum and mining).

Two other sensitivity runs were carried out in which the Washington and WCI programs are unlinked but Washington was assumed to adopt its own price ceiling on cap-and-trade allowance prices.

- In the first case, it was assumed that Washington would adopt California's ceiling price trajectory (i.e., \$65/metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> starting in 2021 rising at 5% per year (and adjusted for inflation) in the first year of its cap-and-invest program (2023).
- In the second case, it was assumed that Washington would adopt a ceiling price trajectory that starts at \$40/metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2023 rising at 5% per year (and adjusted for inflation).

We supplement the results described above (3 scenarios and 2 sensitivities) with the model results that incorporates key elements of the Climate Commitment Act Program Rule (hereafter referred to as the "Proposed Rule"). The Proposed Rule was released in May 2022 that included a ceiling price trajectory of \$72.29 per metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2023 rising at 5% per year (and adjusted for inflation). To model the key elements in the Proposed Rule, we updated the allowance budget, the Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR) allowance availability, the offset credit availability, the no-cost allowance allocation amounts and the auction revenue to be consistent with that outlined in the Proposed Rule and the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.<sup>7</sup> The APCR allowances for the first and second compliance periods of the program (2023 through 2030) were made vintageless and available for auction in 2023 and succeeding years.

- Similar to California, the Washington State Department of Ecology would issue the requisite amount of ceiling price permits to ensure that the allowance permit price stays at or below the adopted ceiling price trajectory. Some of the key research insights for the two sensitivity cases as well as insights from the case where we modeled key elements of the Proposed Rule are presented below with the results for these cases presented in Table 3 and Table 4.
- The economic costs to Washington households are projected to be lower under the unlinked program where Washington adopts its own ceiling price program than under the linked program.
- The average annual costs per household in Washington is projected to be about \$720 in the scenario with Washington adopting California's ceiling price trajectory and \$520 in the scenario with a lower ceiling price trajectory over the 2024 to 2030 time period. Under the ceiling price trajectory in the Proposed Rule, the average annual costs per household is about \$790 over the 2024 to 2030 time period. <sup>8</sup> The lower cost is a result of Washington retaining the value of ceiling price permits within its economy, which would not have been available to Washington under the linked program where it is a net importer of permits.
- The average cost of compliance for motor gasoline and diesel in the unliked program where Washington adopts a ceiling price trajectory that is the same as California's is projected to be the same as that in the linked program (i.e., \$0.67 and \$0.77 per gallon for gasoline and diesel

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Chapter 173-446 WAC, Climate Commitment Act Program Rule (available at <u>https://ecology.wa.gov/Regulations-</u> <u>Permits/Laws-rules-rulemaking/Rulemaking/WAC-173-446</u>); Preliminary Regulatory Analyses, Publication 22-02-015, Department of Ecology, State of Washington, May 2022 (available at <u>https://apps.ecology.wa.gov/publications/documents/2202015.pdf</u>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> All values are denominated in 2021 dollars.

respectively) while in the case with the lower \$40 ceiling price trajectory, the average cost of compliance for motor gasoline and diesel is projected to be about \$0.36 and \$0.41 respectively over the 2024 to 2030 time period. Under the ceiling price trajectory outlined in the Proposed Rule, the average cost of compliance for motor gasoline and diesel is projected to be about \$0.66 and \$0.75 respectively over the 2024 to 2030 time period.<sup>9</sup>

### Table 3: Summary of Key Results (Sensitivity Cases)

	Without WCI Linkage (California Ceiling Price)				Without WCI Linkage (\$40 Ceiling Price)			
	2024	2027	2030	Average Annual (2024-2030)	2024	2027	2030	Average Annual (2024-2030)
Loss in Annual Consumption per Household (2021\$/HH) <sup>10</sup>	\$660	\$710	\$790	\$720	\$460	\$520	\$570	\$520
Cost of Compliance of Motor Gasoline (2021\$/gal)	\$0.58	\$0.67	\$0.77	\$0.67	\$0.31	\$0.36	\$0.41	\$0.36
Cost of Compliance of Diesel (2021\$/gal)	\$0.66	\$0.77	\$0.88	\$0.77	\$0.35	\$0.41	\$0.47	\$0.41
Loss in Output of Energy-Intensive Sectors (%) <sup>11</sup>	-3%	-4%	-5%	-4%	-2%	-4%	-4%	-3%
Allowance Price (2021\$/MT CO <sub>2</sub> )	\$76	\$90	\$103		\$41	\$48	\$55	
Allowance Floor Price (2021\$/MT CO <sub>2</sub> )*	\$21	\$24	\$28		\$21	\$24	\$28	

\*Fiscal Note Summary (12 May 2021)

#### Table 4: Summary of Key Results (Proposed Rule)

	Without WCI Linkage (Proposed Rule)				
	2024	2027	2030	Average Annual (2024-2030)	
Loss in Annual Consumption per Household (2021\$/HH) <sup>12</sup>	\$740	\$770	\$850	\$790	
Cost of Compliance of Motor Gasoline (2021\$/gal)	\$0.56	\$0.65	\$0.75	\$0.66	
Cost of Compliance of Diesel (2021\$/gal)	\$0.64	\$0.75	\$0.86	\$0.75	
Loss in Output of Energy-Intensive Sectors (%) <sup>13</sup>	-4%	-6%	-7%	-6%	
Allowance Price (2021\$/MT CO <sub>2</sub> )	\$75	\$87	\$101		
Allowance Floor Price (2021\$/MT CO <sub>2</sub> )*	\$20	\$24	\$27		

\* Preliminary Regulatory Analyses (16 May 2022)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The lower ceiling price trajectory consists of the ceiling price starting at \$40 per metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2023 rising at 5% per year (and adjusted for inflation).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This metric measures the impacts to an average Washington household's annual personal consumption expenditure (in terms of current spending).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This metric measures the change in quantity of production of the aggregate energy-intensive sector (which comprises pulp and paper, chemicals, glass, cement, iron and steel, alumina and aluminum and mining).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> This metric measures the impacts to an average Washington household's annual personal consumption expenditure (in terms of current spending).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> This metric measures the change in quantity of production of the aggregate energy-intensive sector (which comprises pulp and paper, chemicals, glass, cement, iron and steel, alumina and aluminum and mining).

## **OVERVIEW OF STUDY METHODOLOGY**

The  $N_{ew}$ ERA model is a U.S. economy-wide integrated energy and economic modeling framework with regional disaggregation that integrates a capacity and dispatch model of the U.S. electricity sector with a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy that accounts for production, consumption, and investment decisions across regions and economic sectors. The model includes household decisions that affect overall energy use and related emissions from combustion of fossil fuels and industrial process emissions.

The N<sub>ew</sub>ERA modeling system includes 14 types of existing electric generating technologies. New technology types that the model can build, in addition to existing types, include advanced coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS), natural gas combined cycle with CCS, offshore wind, onshore wind with storage, and photovoltaic solar with storage. The model includes two different types of vehicles - internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEs) and battery-operated Electric vehicles (BEVs) as well as biofuel representation for the gasoline and the diesel markets. The modeling framework assesses the economic impacts from policies by accounting for important sectoral and regional interactions that take place in the economy in addition to the direct costs or other effects of the policy.

The N<sub>ew</sub>ERA model used for this study represents Washington and California as separate regions. This disaggregation allows the model to simulate region specific policies, especially when modeling the WCI program. Quebec's program is represented by a marginal abatement cost curve in the model. The model includes five energy (coal, natural gas, crude oil, petroleum products, and electric) sectors and seven non-energy (agriculture, energy-intensive sectors, services, motor vehicle manufacturing, other manufacturing, commercial trucking, and commercial transportation) sectors.<sup>14</sup> The analysis baseline was calibrated to the projections published by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) as defined in its Annual Energy Outlook 2021 Reference Case.

For this study, six scenarios were simulated - two scenarios that link Washington's program with the WCI program – with and without access to "speed bumps", a scenario in which there is no linkage (with the cap-and-invest program's default assumptions), two additional sensitivity scenarios where the programs are unlinked but where Washington was assumed to adopt its own ceiling price trajectory and an additional scenario with no linkage where key elements of the Proposed Rule were modeled. For the first five scenarios, Washington's CO<sub>2</sub> emission cap<sup>15</sup> was developed using the total greenhouse gas (GHG) allowance budget level specified in the Fiscal Note Summary and a GHG to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions ratio for 2019.<sup>16</sup> Offset credit allowances and APCR allowance set-asides were also developed based on the information specified in the Fiscal Note Summary. No-cost allowance allocations are made to the energy intensive trade exposed (EITE) sectors, electric utilities, and natural gas utilities.<sup>17</sup> Similar to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The model treats biomass as a carbon-neutral fuel source. It additionally does not include net-zero emission technologies which if deployed would likely reduce the projected impacts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The NewERA model only represents CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Pg. 121, Fiscal Note Summary (available at <u>https://fnspublic.ofm.wa.gov/FNSPublicSearch/GetPDF?packageID=63362</u>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> As specified in Pg. 120 of the Fiscal Note Summary, electric utilities are not required to consign any of their allocated no-cost allowances in the first compliance period. Thus, the study assumes none of the revenues from the no-cost allowances allocated to electric utilities are applied to reducing electricity rates in the first compliance period. In the absence of current rules relating

development of Washington's CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cap, the no-cost GHG allowances are also scaled down to represent CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations using the 2019 GHG to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions ratios for these entities. Allowances are assumed to be purchased at the model's projected allowance price rather than at the estimated average purchase price specified in the Fiscal Note.<sup>18</sup> The auction revenues that are deposited into the Climate Commitment Account (which equal 75% of the total revenues from the Climate Investment Account) as well as the revenues deposited into the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account are assumed to be returned in a lumpsum manner to the Washington households in this study. The auction revenues deposited into the Natural Climate Solutions Account (which equal 25% of the revenues from the Climate Investment Account) are used to subsidize the output of the water and sewage utilities sector and the fishing and the forestry sector in the N<sub>ew</sub>ERA model. The auction revenues deposited into the allowance budget, APCR availability, offset availability, no-cost CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations to EITEs, natural gas utilities, electric utilities, and distribution of auction revenues from the Proposed Rule were employed.<sup>19</sup>

For California and Quebec, the joint emissions cap modeled follows the trajectories specified in the AB 398 and SB 32 bills with lumpsum revenue recycling to households. Under the linked scenario, permit trading is allowed among California, Quebec, and Washington; whereas in the unlinked scenarios, trading is prohibited between the WCI jurisdictions and Washington. The model assumes transfer of permit revenues between regions. In all of the scenarios, California's program also includes the current Low Carbon Fuels Standard, Renewable Portfolio Standard, energy efficiency programs as well as existing electric vehicle mandates.

# **OVERVIEW OF N<sub>EW</sub>ERA MODELING FRAMEWORK AND MODELING ASSUMPTIONS**

### A. General Features of the NewERA Framework

NERA's  $N_{ew}$ ERA model is an energy-economy modeling framework that integrates a bottom-up representation of the U.S. electricity sector with a top-down representation of the production, consumption, and investment decisions across the rest of the U.S, economy, including household

to no-cost allowance allocations from the second compliance period onwards, it was assumed that from the second compliance period and going forward, 100% of the revenues from the no-cost allowances allocated to electric utilities are applied towards reducing electricity rates. For natural gas utilities, 65% of the allowances in 2023 would be consigned increasing to 5% per year to 100% consignment by 2030 (as specified in the Fiscal Note Summary) with the revenues applied towards reducing natural gas prices for the benefit of ratepayers. For EITEs, 100% of the revenues from the no-cost allowances are applied towards subsidizing the output from these entities (as specified in the Fiscal Note Summary).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Per Pg. 121 of the Fiscal Note Summary, allowances are assumed to be purchased at an estimated average purchase price which is calculated as the floor price adjusted by the percentage change in the annual allowance budget for auctions caused by the removal of offset usage and compliance curve adjustments for EITE allowances. We have assumed in our modeling that allowances would be purchased at the model's projected allowance price instead.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> It was assumed that electric utilities would consign 100% of their no-cost allocated allowances to auction. For natural gas utilities, it was assumed that 65% of the no-cost allocated allowances in 2023 would be consigned increasing to 5% per year to 100% consignment by 2030 (as outlined in Section 2.5.3 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document).

decisions that affect overall energy use and related GHG emissions. The modeling framework assesses the economic impacts from policies by accounting for important sectoral and regional interactions that take place in the economy in addition to the direct costs or other effects of the policy.

The top-down portion of  $N_{ew}ERA$  is a forward-looking dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the U.S. economy. It simulates all key economic interactions in the U.S. economy, including those among industries, households, and the government. Industries and households maximize profits and utility, respectively, with foresight about future economic conditions. The theoretical construct behind the model is based on the circular flow of goods, services, and payments in the economy—every economic transaction has a buyer and a seller whereby goods and services go from a seller to a buyer and payments for the goods and services goes from the buyer to the seller.

The CGE model is centered around the decisions of a representative household that characterizes the economic behavior of an average consumer. Households provide labor and capital to businesses, taxes to the government, and savings to the financial markets, while also consuming goods and services and receiving government subsidies. One of the decisions that households make with respect to services is how to meet personal transportation needs. In addition to deciding on the quantity of personal vehicle miles traveled (VMT), households in N<sub>ew</sub>ERA choose between two different types of vehicles - internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEs) and battery-operated electric vehicles (BEVs). The household's vehicle choice depends upon the relative vehicle life-cycle cost differences and consumers' preferences for different vehicles.

The economic sectors in the model, in aggregate, account for all of the production and commercial activities of the economy. Each economic sector uses labor, capital, energy resources, other sector's outputs, and imported inputs to produce their own specific category of goods or services. Economic sectors pay their share of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax and health insurance, and corporate taxes to the government. Industries are both consumers and producers of capital for investment in the rest of the economy.

One of the sectors in N<sub>ew</sub>ERA is the electricity sector. This sector is modeled in a bottom-up (i.e., technology-specific) manner that is fully integrated with the rest of the economy (which is simulated in the CGE framework described above). The model includes all existing electric generating units, while future capacity investment and economic retirement decisions are represented simultaneously with dispatch decisions. The model dispatches electricity to load duration curves. Long-term investment and retirement decisions and short-term unit dispatch decisions are projected by solving a dynamic, non-linear program with an objective function that minimizes the present value of total system costs, while complying with all system constraints, such as meeting demand, renewable portfolio standards, reserve margin requirements, emissions limits, transmission limits, clean energy standards, and other environmental and electric specific policy mandates.

The CGE portion of the  $N_{ew}ERA$  model also incorporates the government. In the model, the government collects revenues from taxes imposed on labor and capital. Revenues are used to pay for government services, which are held constant in every scenario. The model also holds overall government debt the same in all scenarios by either returning excess revenues to the consumers, or by increasing taxes. The rebates or revenue-raising actions may be performed on a lump-sum basis (e.g., by changing the standard

deduction) or by altering tax rates. Unless otherwise stated, the model uses the lump-sum transfer assumption.

Within the circular flow of the above described macroeconomy, an equilibrium is found whereby demand for goods and services equals their supply, and investments are optimized for the long term. Thus, supply equals demand in all markets for all time periods. The model produces integrated projections of the energy sector and other economic activities for future years and estimates the energy market and macroeconomic impacts of a potential policy by comparing projections of the future with and without the policy's requirements included in the model's input assumptions. Figure 1 provides a simplified representation of the key elements of the N<sub>ew</sub>ERA modeling system.

### Figure 1: NewERA Modeling System Representation



The New ERA Model

### B. Electric Sector Model

The N<sub>ew</sub>ERA modeling system's electric sector model is a detailed bottom-up model of the electric and coal sectors. The model is fully dynamic and includes perfect foresight (under the assumption that future conditions are known). Thus, all decisions within the model are based on minimizing the present value of costs over the entire time horizon of the model while meeting all specified constraints, regarding demand, peak demand, emissions limits, transmission limits, RPS regulations, CES regulations, fuel availability and costs, new build limits and CCS retrofit build or retire requirements for coal units. The model set-up

is intended to mimic decisions made by electric sector investors and system operators. In determining the least-cost method of satisfying specified constraints, the model determines the following:

- Investment decisions (*e.g.*, addition of retrofits, build new capacity, repower unit, add fuel switching capacity, or retire units)
- Unit operations decisions (*e.g.*, unit dispatch by fuel and technology and optimal power generation mix)

In the model, we represent over 17,000 electricity generating units in the United States. Larger coal units (greater than 200 MW) are individually represented in the model and smaller units are aggregated based on region, size, and existing controls for ease of computation. All other types of units are included in different regional aggregates based on their operating characteristics. Table 5 shows the existing generating technologies in the electric sector model.

Table 5	5: Existing	Generating	Technologies	in the Electric	<b>Sector Model</b>

Coal	Pumped Storage Hydroelectric
Natural Gas Combined Cycle	Biomass
Natural Gas Combustion Turbine	Geothermal
Gas/Oil Steam	Landfill Gas
Oil Combustion Turbine	Municipal Solid Waste
Onshore Wind	Solar Photovoltaic
Hydroelectric (Run-of-River)	Concentrated Solar Thermal

New technology types that the model can build, in addition to existing types, include advanced coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS), natural gas combined cycle with CCS, offshore wind, onshore wind with storage, and photovoltaic solar with storage. Annual build limits can be specified to reflect real world constraints. The model can also accommodate joint build limits that apply to multiple new technology types.

Each unit in the model has certain number of actions it can take. For example, all units can retire, and most can undergo retrofits. Any publicly-announced actions, such as planned retirements, planned retrofits (for existing units), or new units under construction can be specified. In the model, generating units are responsive to environmental limits specified in the model. Such limits include emission caps (for SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>x</sub>, Hg, and CO<sub>2</sub>) that can be applied at the national, regional, state or unit level. The user can also specify allowance prices for emissions, emission rates (especially for toxics such as Hg), and heat rate levels that must be met by assets.

Similar to investment decisions, the operation of each unit in a given year depends on the policies in place (e.g., unit-level standards), electricity demand, and operating costs – especially energy prices. The model accounts for these conditions in determining dispatch decisions of each unit. On top of unit-level regulations, the model also considers system-wide operational issues such as environmental regulations,

limits on the share of generation from intermittent resources, transmission limits, and operational reserve margin requirements in addition to annual reserve margin constraints.

To meet increasing electricity demand and reserve margin requirements over time, the electric sector must build new generating capacity. Future environmental regulations and forecasted energy prices influence decisions on technology type and location of asset. Policies will also likely affect retirement decisions – an asset will be retired if the model deems it uneconomic to keep that asset operating given future regulatory, technological, and economic constraints. All model decisions hence optimize over all current and future assumptions that may impact resource planning. For this analysis, Washington state was modeled as a separate region in the electricity sector model. The version of the electricity sector model employed for this analysis contains 64 U.S. electricity regions (and 11 Canadian electricity regions) as shown in Figure 2 with Washington state's electric system represented by the "WEWA" power pool in the model.<sup>20</sup>





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The NewERA electric sector model regions are based on the model regions in EPA's Integrated Planning Model (IPM) and are designed to be approximately consistent with the configuration of the NERC assessment regions in the NERC Long-Term Reliability Assessments. (available at <u>https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/clean-air-markets-power-sector-modeling</u>). The adjoining 11 Canadian electricity regions are not shown in the figure.

### C. Macroeconomic Model

The N<sub>ew</sub>ERA macroeconomic model is a forward-looking, dynamic, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the United States. The model simulates all economic interactions in the U.S. economy, including those among industry, households, and the government.

The N<sub>ew</sub>ERA CGE framework uses a standard theoretical macroeconomic structure to capture the flow of goods and factors of production within the economy. A simplified version of these interdependent macroeconomic flows is shown in Figure 3. The model solution assumes an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium. This general equilibrium is characterized by three principles: i) zero-profit, which states any economic activity must earn zero profit as the value of inputs equal the value of outputs; ii) market clearance, which states supply must equal demand for all positively priced goods; and iii) income balance, which states all agents' income must equal its factor endowments plus any net transfers received.

Accordingly, in the model, households supply factors of production, including labor and capital, to firms. Firms provide households with payments for the factors of production in return. Firm output is produced from a combination of production factors and intermediate inputs of goods and services supplied by other sectors of the economy (both domestic and foreign). Similarly, each firm's final output is either consumed within the United States or exported abroad. In addition to consuming goods and services, households can accumulate savings, which they provide to firms for investments in new production capacity. The government agent receives taxes from both households and firms, contributes to the production of goods and services, and purchases goods and services. Although the model assumes equilibrium, there exist capital flow within regions as they run deficits or surpluses. In aggregate, the value of firm output must equal the sum of its production inputs (zero-profit), the sum of regional commodities and factors of production must equal their demands (market clearance), and household income must equal its factor endowments plus any tax revenue received (income balance). In the model framework, the cost of fuels such as gasoline and diesel account for the costs associated with the manufacturing and transportation of the fuels. The price to the consumer is dependent on the dynamics of the fuel markets, including but not limited to supply and demand conditions, plus any applicable taxes and fees.



### Figure 3: Interdependent Economic Flows in NewERA's Macroeconomic Model

### D. Modeling Assumptions

### **Baseline Conditions**

The  $N_{ew}ERA$  baseline for this analysis was calibrated to the projections published by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) as defined in its Annual Energy Outlook 2021 (AEO 2021) Reference Case.<sup>21</sup> This baseline includes the effects of continuing implementation of energy and environmental regulations that have already been promulgated (e.g., the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the California GHG cap-and-trade program, federal vehicle fuel economy standards, federal appliance energy efficiency standards, and state renewable portfolio standards). The current renewable portfolio standards (RPS) of each state are also represented in  $N_{ew}ERA$ 's electricity sector baseline. The RPS policy specifications are based on the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory's RPS Annual Status Update publication.<sup>22</sup>

Key assumptions drawn from the AEO 2021 Reference case include natural gas and crude oil prices, regional electricity demand, and total stock projections for different light-duty vehicle classes. Assumptions relating to the non-electric sector  $CO_2$  emissions for Washington state were drawn from the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2021, January 2021 (available at <u>https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/</u>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, U.S. Renewable Portfolio Standards: 2021 Annual Status Update, Electricity Markets and Policy Group, 2021 (available at <u>https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/us-renewables-portfolio-standards-3</u>).

Carbon Tax Assessment Model (CTAM)<sup>23</sup> developed by the Washington State Department of Commerce supplemented by data from the AEO 2021 Reference case.<sup>24</sup> Assumptions relating to the non-electric CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for California were drawn from the 2020 edition of the California GHG Inventory<sup>25</sup> supplemented by data from the AEO 2021 Reference case. Assumptions relating to non-electric sector CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for the rest of the U.S. are also drawn from the AEO 2021 Reference case. The technology cost assumptions for new fossil-fuel, nuclear and renewable electric generators are based on the EIA's AEO 2021 cost and performance characteristics estimates.<sup>26</sup> Assumptions relating to the attributes of electric vehicles such as fuel economy and on the cost markups of electric vehicles relative to conventional vehicles were also drawn from the AEO 2021 Reference case. Assumptions relating to the cost characteristics, carbon intensity, conversion efficiencies, supply of biofuels as well as blend wall and blend limit specifications for biofuels were drawn from the California Air Resources Board's (CARB) Biofuel Supply Module and ARB's May 2015 Proposed 15 Day Changes LCFS Pathways Scenario.<sup>27</sup>

### Model Details Specific to This Study

The version of the macroeconomic model used in the analysis is produced by calibrating the  $N_{ew}ERA$  computations framework to reflect a specific set of baseline projections (trends) over the policy impact time period of concern. This analysis estimates economic impacts for the period from 2021 through 2042 with estimates for every third year in that time period.

The  $N_{ew}$ ERA model used for this study represents Washington, California, and Rest of the U.S. as three separate regions. The model also includes sectoral disaggregation tailored to match policy implementation and impact considerations. The version of the  $N_{ew}$ ERA model used in this analysis includes 12 economic sectors. Five of these are energy sectors, which include coal mining (COL), natural gas extraction and gathering (GAS), crude oil (CRU), petroleum refining (OIL), and the electricity sector (ELE). (The labels used to identify each sector in the model are indicated in parentheses.) The seven non-energy sectors<sup>28</sup> represented in this analysis are as follows:

- Agriculture (AGR)
- Commercial transportation other than trucking (TRN)
- Commercial trucking (TRK)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Washington State Department of Commerce, Carbon Tax Assessment Model, January 2021 (available at https://www.commerce.wa.gov/growing-the-economy/energy/washington-state-energy-office/carbon-tax/).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> This includes CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion and process CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the industrial sector (which relate to emissions from the chemical transformation of raw materials).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> California Greenhouse Gas 2000-2018 Emissions Trends and Indicators Report (available at <u>https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ghg-inventory-data</u>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> "Cost and Performance Characteristics of New Generating Technologies," in Annual Energy Outlook, 2021 (available at <a href="https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/electricity.pdf">https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/assumptions/pdf/electricity.pdf</a>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> ARB's Biofuel Supply Module Technical Documentation available as part of the materials from the September 14, 2016 CARB Public Workshop on the Transportation Sector to Inform Development of the 2030 Target Scoping Plan Update (available at <u>https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/meetings/meetings.htm</u>; ARB's May 2015 Proposed 15-Day Changes Scenario).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> The non-energy manufacturing sub-sectors are aggregated to 3-digit NAICS code and are consistent with U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS) sectors.

- Energy-intensive sectors (EIS)<sup>29</sup>
- Motor vehicle manufacturing (M\_V)
- All other sectors (MAN)<sup>30</sup>
- Services (SRV)

In the transportation sector, household chose between two different types of vehicles – internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEs) and battery-operated electric vehicles (BEVs) based on the relative vehicle life cycle cost differences and consumers' preferences for different vehicles. The model also includes biofuels that can be substituted for gasoline and diesel. Biofuels that can be substituted for gasoline includes imported sugar ethanol, corn ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and biomass-to-liquid fuel (BTL), compressed natural gas (CNG). Likewise, for the diesel market we include bio-diesel from waste grease and corn, CNG, and BTL diesel.

This study has been conducted to produce Washington, California and rest of the U.S. average energy and macroeconomic outcomes for four policy scenarios through 2042. The first of these scenarios reflects one that links Washington's program with the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) program. In this scenario, all three regions (Washington, California, and Quebec) form a single allowance permit market and are able to sell and buy permits across regions while in the other scenarios, no linkage between the two programs is assumed. In these scenarios, Washington cannot use permits to offset its emissions and has to rely on its own allowances. In all the scenarios modeled, we assume full banking behavior.<sup>31</sup> The differences in the economic impact of the four scenarios are characterized by comparing their projected changes for several model outputs that are commonly considered to be relevant measures of economic and energy market impact:

- Allowance permit prices
- Consumer welfare,
- U.S. gross domestic product,
- Household consumption,
- Economy-wide fuel consumption,
- Economy-wide electricity generation mix, and
- Wholesale and retail fuel and electricity prices.

The model has the capability to report variety of other modeling outputs of interest that are associated with the above economic impacts for each policy scenario. These include the mix of personal vehicles on the road (internal combustion vs. electric), and  $CO_2$  emissions over time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> This comprises pulp and paper, chemicals, glass, cement, iron and steel, alumina and aluminum and mining.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> This comprises construction, food, beverage, and tobacco products, fabricated metal products, machinery, computer and electronic products, transportation equipment, electrical equipment, appliances, and components, wood and furniture, plastics, and other manufacturing sectors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> For our analysis, we do not model the implication of holding limits that specify the maximum number of allowances that may be held for use or trade by a registered entity at any one time.

The following is a summary of the specific cap-and-trade elements for the different jurisdictions that were modeled for all of the scenarios.

### Washington Specific Assumptions<sup>32</sup>

For Washington, the GHG allowance budget available to covered entities that is specified in the Fiscal Note Summary equals 65.6 MMTCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2023 declining to about 20.4 MMTCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2040. Since the N<sub>ew</sub>ERA model only represents CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, a CO<sub>2</sub>-only emissions cap was developed by scaling the GHG allowance budget downward using the ratio of GHG emissions to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for 2019. This ratio was developed using data from the Washington Department of Ecology's facility-level greenhouse has reports.<sup>33</sup> The CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cap modeled equals 54.6 MMTCO<sub>2</sub> in 2023 declining to about 17.0 MMTCO<sub>2</sub> in 2040. The program specifies two compliance periods – a first compliance period from 2023 to 2026 and a second compliance period from 2027 to 2030. To model the primary scenarios (i.e., the first three scenarios), a total of 4% of the annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cap set were aside in the APCR with 30% of the prior's year reserve to be sold at the prior year's auction floor price, leaving unsold allowances in the reserve. The no-cost allowance allocations to EITEs, electric utilities and natural gas utilities are also scaled down to represent CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations using the 2019 GHG to CO<sub>2</sub> emission ratios for these entities using data from the Washington Department of Ecology's facility-level greenhouse has reports.

Offset credits that could be used to satisfy compliance obligations are specified as fixed percentages of the  $CO_2$  auction allowance budget, calculated by subtracting the allowance set asides in the containment reserve and the no-cost allowances from the  $CO_2$  emissions cap.<sup>34</sup> It was assumed that offsets would be available at a 20% discount to the estimated average auction purchase price outlined in the state's fiscal note.

An estimate of the total  $CO_2$  allowances available to be purchased at auction is obtained by subtracting the offset credits, the allowance set-asides in the containment reserve and the no-cost  $CO_2$  allowance allocations from the  $CO_2$  emissions cap. This estimate is then multiplied by the shares of the fiscal revenue deposited into each of the state investment accounts to calculate the  $CO_2$  allowances that relate to each of the accounts (Climate Investment Account, Carbon Emissions Reduction Account, and the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account). The revenue from the auctioned  $CO_2$  allowances that relate to each of these accounts is modeled as follows.

• The auction revenues that are deposited into the Climate Commitment Account (which equal 75% of the total revenues from the Climate Investment Account) as well as the revenues deposited into the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account are assumed to be returned in a lumpsum manner to the Washington households in this study.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> The elements of Washington state's cap-and-invest program that were modeled by NERA are consistent with the provisions of the program per the Final Bill Report and the Fiscal Note Summary (available at <u>https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2021-22/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/5126-S2.E%20SBR%20FBR%2021.pdf?q=2021115065505; https://fnspublic.ofm.wa.gov/FNSPublicSearch/GetPDF?packageID=63362).</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Greenhouse gas emissions data, Facility greenhouse gas report, Department of Ecology, State of Washington (available at <u>https://ecology.wa.gov/Air-Climate/Climate-change/Tracking-greenhouse-gases/Greenhouse-gas-reporting/Facility-greenhouse-gas-reports</u>). The GHG to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions ratio for 2019 was calculated to be 83.17%.

 $<sup>^{34}</sup>$  8% during the first compliance period (2023-2026) and 6% thereafter.

- The auction revenues deposited into the Natural Climate Solutions Account (which equal 25% of the revenues from the Climate Investment Account) are used to subsidize the output of the water and sewage utilities sector and the fishing and the forestry sector.
- The auction revenues deposited into the Carbon Emissions Reduction Account are used to subsidize electric vehicles and commercial transportation.

The emissions from the following categories were exempted from coverage across the entire duration of the program.

- Aviation fuel combustion and watercraft fuels<sup>35</sup>
- Coal-fired electric generation<sup>36</sup>
- Biofuels that have 40 percent lower GHG emissions based on a full-life cycle analysis compared to petroleum fuels<sup>37</sup>
- Motor vehicle and special fuel used for agricultural purposes by a farm fuel user<sup>38</sup>
- National security facilities<sup>39</sup>
- Entities with GHG emissions lesser than 25,000 MTCO<sub>2</sub>e<sup>40</sup>

Table 6 shows the baseline CO<sub>2</sub>, non-CO<sub>2</sub> and GHG emission projections.

MMTCO <sub>2e</sub>	2024	2027	2030	2033	2036	2039	2042
Residential CO <sub>2</sub>	6.5	6.8	6.7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.6
Commercial CO <sub>2</sub>	4.0	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0
Industrial CO <sub>2</sub>	15.5	16.0	16.7	16.9	17.2	17.8	17.7
Transportation CO <sub>2</sub>	44.0	45.1	46.5	46.5	46.2	47.7	47.0

### Table 6: Baseline Total CO<sub>2</sub>, Non-CO<sub>2</sub> and GHG Emission Projections

<sup>38</sup> We exempt about 53% of the petroleum emissions from the agriculture sector in Washington state.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> The emissions from these two categories to calculated to be about 86% of the total emissions from all the categories that constitute the N<sub>ew</sub>ERA model's commercial transportation sector using data from Washington's state 1990-2018 GHG inventory (available at <u>https://ecology.wa.gov/Air-Climate/Climate-change/Tracking-greenhouse-gases/Greenhouse-gase-reporting/Inventories</u>).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> We exempt emissions from the two coal-fired units in Washington state (Centralia Units 1 and 2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> We exempt emissions from Sugar Ethanol, Cellulosic Ethanol, BTL diesel, Bio-diesel, and CNG.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> We exempt emissions from national security facilities in Washington state which is estimated to account for about 45% of the emissions from the government sector.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> To exempt emissions from these entities in our modeling, we rely on the 2018 Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) data tables for Washington state (available at <u>https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/econ/susb/2018-susb-annual.html</u>). Using this data, we calculate the percentage of firms in each of the four N<sub>ew</sub>ERA sectors in Washington state - AGR, EIS, MAN, that are reported to have <10 employees. This is employed as a proxy to represent entities with GHG emissions lesser than 25,000 MTCO<sub>2</sub>e. These percentages are then applied to the baseline CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from each of the four sectors in the N<sub>ew</sub>ERA model to calculate the emission exemptions from these sectors. The exemption shares developed using this approach were obtained to be 83% for AGR, 52% for EIS, 78% for MAN, and 74% for the SRV sector.

Electric CO <sub>2</sub>	7.5	3.6	3.3	3.3	4.6	4.6	4.6
Total CO <sub>2</sub>	77.6	75.6	77.3	77.2	78.4	80.6	80.1
Covered CO <sub>2</sub>	56.4	56.7	57.4	56.9	57.5	59.3	58.4
Non-Covered CO <sub>2</sub>	21.2	18.9	19.9	20.3	20.9	21.3	21.6
Non-CO <sub>2</sub> <sup>41</sup>	15.7	15.3	15.6	15.6	15.8	16.3	16.2
Total GHG <sup>42</sup>	93.2	90.9	92.9	92.8	94.3	96.9	96.2

Table 7 shows the GHG emissions allowance budget specified in the Fiscal Note Summary, the  $CO_2$  emissions allowance budget ( $CO_2$  emissions cap) developed and the total no-cost  $CO_2$  allowance allocations.<sup>43</sup>

Table 7: GHG, CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Allowance Budget and No-Cost CO<sub>2</sub> Allowance Allocations (Fiscal Note)

MMTCO <sub>2</sub> e	2024	2027	2030	2033	2036	2039	2042
GHG Emissions Allowance Budget	61.3	51.0	37.1	31.7	26.6	21.5	18.4
CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions Allowance Budget	51.0	42.4	30.9	26.4	22.1	17.9	15.3
Total CO <sub>2</sub> No-Cost Allocations	23.8	19.9	16.3	14.6	13.3	11.9	10.7

In the linked case with "speed bumps", Washington was assumed to adopt reserve tiers or otherwise have access to "speed bump" allowances from California with the "speed bump" prices set at one-half and three-fourths of the difference between the floor and ceiling prices. To represent myopic behavior, it was assumed that the obligated parties will use an adequate amount of allowances such that the allowance price would remain at the "speed bump" price in 2024. In the three additional sensitivity scenarios (without WCI linkage) that were run, Washington was assumed to adopt its own price ceiling on cap-and-trade allowance prices. In the first scenario, it was assumed that Washington would adopt California's ceiling price trajectory (i.e., 65/metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> starting in 2021 rising at 5% per year (and adjusted for inflation). In the third case, we modeled the ceiling price trajectory set in the Proposed Rule which is consistent with California's ceiling price trajectory. The ceiling price starts at 72.29/metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2023 rising at 5% per year (and adjusted for inflation).

In the first two sensitivity scenarios, the assumptions that relate to the  $CO_2$  allowance cap, the containment reserve allowances, the no-cost allowance allocations, the offset credits that can be used to

 $<sup>^{41}</sup>$  The Non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the baseline are estimated using the total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the baseline and the GHG to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions ratio for 2019 of 83.17%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> The total GHG emissions equal the sum of the total CO<sub>2</sub> and non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> These are comprised of the no-cost CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations to emissions-intensive and trade-exposed entities (EITEs), electric utilities, and natural gas utilities.

satisfy compliance obligations, and the allowances that relate to each of the investment accounts are identical to the assumptions used to the model the primary scenarios. In modeling the key elements of the Proposed Rule, updated assumptions that relate to the allowance budget, APCR availability, offset availability, no-cost  $CO_2$  allowance allocations, and auction revenue from the Proposed Rule were employed. These are as follows.

- A GHG allowance budget available to covered entities (that excludes reserves) of 58.5 MMTCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2023 declining to about 15.7 MMTCO<sub>2</sub>e in 2040.<sup>44</sup> Since the NewERA model only represents CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, a CO<sub>2</sub>-only emissions cap was developed from the GHG allowance budget using the approach described previously. The CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cap modeled equals 48.7 MMTCO<sub>2</sub> in 2023 declining to about 13.1 MMTCO<sub>2</sub> in 2040.
- 5 percent of the GHG allowance budget (that includes reserves) to be placed in an APCR. <sup>45</sup> The APCR allowances for the years 2023 through 2030 were made vintageless and available for auction in 2023 and succeeding years. CO<sub>2</sub>-only APCR allowance set-asides were calculated from the GHG amounts using the approach described previously.
- The no-cost CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations to EITEs, electric utilities and natural gas utilities are calculated as follows:
  - Using the baseline GHG emissions for EITEs, electric utilities, and natural gas utilities specified in the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document<sup>46</sup> we constructed a baseline GHG trajectory for each of these sectors from 2023 to 2040.<sup>47</sup>
  - The no-cost GHG allowance allocations for 2023 to 2040 were then calculated by multiplying the baseline GHG emissions with the allowance schedule specified for each of the sectors.<sup>48</sup> The shares that the allowances allocated to each sector represent of the total are then calculated for each sector.
  - The total no-cost GHG allowance allocations for 2023 to 2040 specified in the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document<sup>49</sup> are distributed to the three sectors using shares calculated above.
  - The GHG no-cost allowance allocations to EITEs, electric utilities and natural gas utilities are scaled down to CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations using the approach described previously.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> See Table 26 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> The GHG allowance budget (that includes reserves) was developed using the cap (that excludes reserves) presented in Table 26 and the reserve provisions outlined in Section 2.5.2.5 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document. The reserve provisions comprise of 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of one percent of the budget set aside in the Voluntary Renewable Electricity Reserve Account (VRERA), 5 percent set aside in the APCR and 2 percent in the Emissions Containment Reserve (ECR).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> See Table 21 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> To construct the 2023-2040 baseline GHG emissions trajectory, we adopted an emissions reduction pathway that was the same as that in the Fiscal Note analysis. Through 2030, the emissions reduction was equal to 6.15% of the sector's baseline emissions in 2023 while from 2031 to 2040, the emission reduction was 4.6% of the sector's baseline emissions in 2030.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See Section 2.5.3 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> See Table 25 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

- It was assumed that electric utilities would consign 100% of their no-cost allocated  $CO_2$ allowances to auction. For natural gas utilities, it was assumed that 65% of the no-cost allocated  $CO_2$  allowances in 2023 would be consigned increasing to 5% per year to 100% consignment by 2030.<sup>50</sup>
- Offset credits that could be used to satisfy compliance obligations are specified as fixed percentages of the CO<sub>2</sub> auction allowance budget,<sup>51</sup> calculated by subtracting the allowance set asides in the APCR and the no-cost allowances from the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cap. The offsets are made available at a 15% discount<sup>52</sup> to the projected allowance price.<sup>53</sup>
- An estimate of the total CO<sub>2</sub> allowances available to be purchased at auction is obtained by subtracting the offset credits, the allowance set-asides in the containment reserve and the no-cost CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations from the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cap. The CO<sub>2</sub> allowances to be deposited into each of the three investment accounts (Carbon Emissions Reduction Account, Climate Investment Account, and the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account) are calculated as follows.
  - For the Carbon Emissions Reduction Account, we use the auction revenues that are stated to be deposited into the account by fiscal year<sup>54</sup> and translate these revenues into GHG allowance amounts using the projected allowance prices.<sup>55</sup> The GHG allowance amounts are scaled down to CO<sub>2</sub> allowances using the approach described previously.
  - The remaining CO<sub>2</sub> allowances (after subtracting the Carbon Emissions Reduction Account deposits) are distributed to the Climate Investment Account and the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account based on revenue shares from the Fiscal Note analysis.<sup>56</sup>
  - About 75% of allowances deposited into the Climate Investment Account go into the Climate Commitment Account while the remainder go into the Natural Climate Solutions account.
- The revenue from the auctioned CO<sub>2</sub> allowances that relate to each of the accounts are modeled in a manner described previously.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> See Section 2.5.3 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> 8% during the first compliance period (2023-2026) and 6% thereafter (*See* Section 2.3.6 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> See Section 2.5.4 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> See Table 24 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> See Section 2.4.1 of Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> See Table 24 of the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> On average from 2023-2040, the share of revenues deposited into the Climate Investment Account and the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account were assumed to be 89% and 11% respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> The auction revenues from the CO<sub>2</sub> allowances that are deposited into the Climate Commitment Account and the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account are assumed to be returned in a lumpsum manner to the Washington households; The auction revenues from the CO<sub>2</sub> allowances deposited into the Natural Climate Solutions Account are used to subsidize the output of the water and sewage utilities sector and the fishing and the forestry sector; The auction revenues from the CO<sub>2</sub>

Table 9 shows the GHG emissions allowance budget (including reserves) from the Preliminary Regulatory Analyses document, the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions allowance budget (CO<sub>2</sub> emissions cap) developed and the total no-cost CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations.<sup>58</sup>

MMTCO <sub>2</sub> e	2024	2027	2030	2033	2036	2039	2042
GHG Emissions Allowance Budget	58.4	44.1	29.9	26.0	22.1	18.3	14.4
CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions Allowance Budget	48.6	36.7	24.8	21.6	18.4	15.2	12.0
Total CO <sub>2</sub> No-Cost Allocations	16.6	11.2	9.1	7.1	5.5	4.2	3.0

Table 8: GHG, CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Allowance Budget and No-Cost CO<sub>2</sub> Allowance Allocations (Proposed Rule)

### California Specific Assumptions<sup>59</sup>

For California, the emissions cap modeled in  $N_{ew}ERA$  was based on a 2030 GHG target of 40% below 1990 levels with the emissions cap assumed to decline towards the 2050 target of 80% below 1990 levels. Offset credits that could be used to satisfy compliance obligations were specified as fixed percentages of the annual emissions cap.<sup>60</sup> A price ceiling on cap-and-trade allowance prices of \$65/metric ton of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2021 rising at 5% per year (and adjusted for inflation) was modeled along with two reserve tiers with the prices of allowances to be made available at these tiers set at one-half and three-fourths of the difference between the floor and ceiling prices. A certain portion of the allowances from the annual emissions cap was placed into an APCR.<sup>61</sup> Two-thirds of the remaining APCR allowances at the end of 2020 were spread evenly across the two reserve tiers and the remaining one-third plus unsold allowances that have been transferred into the APCR were made available for purchase at the ceiling price. Additional allowances were set aside for the two lower price reserve tiers from 2021-2030 per the specification in the cap-and-trade regulation (as shown in Table 9).<sup>62</sup>

allowances deposited into the Carbon Emissions Reduction Account are used to subsidize electric vehicles and commercial transportation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> These are comprised of the no-cost CO<sub>2</sub> allowance allocations to EITEs, electric utilities, and natural gas utilities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Regulation for the California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms (available at <u>https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/cap-and-trade-regulation-unofficial-current-version</u>); "USA – California Cap-and-Trade Program," ETS Detailed Information, International Carbon Action Partnership, Last Updated: 12 April 2021 (available at <u>https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com\_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%5D=45</u>).

<sup>60 8%</sup> from 2018 to 2020, 4% from 2021 to 2025, and 6% post 2025.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> 1% from the 2013-2014 compliance period; 4% from the 2015-2017 compliance period; and 7% from the 2018-2020 compliance period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Regulation for the California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-Based Compliance Mechanisms (available at <u>https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/cap-and-trade-regulation-unofficial-current-version</u>).

Table 9: Number of California GHG Allowances Allocated to the APCR for Budget Years 2021 to	)
2030	

Budget Year	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
APCR Allocations (MMT CO <sub>2</sub> e)	12.77	11.57	10.37	9.27	8.07	6.97	5.77	4.57	3.47	2.27

A suite of the California specific complementary measures was also modeled for all of the scenarios which include a 50% renewable portfolio standard by 2030, a doubling of energy efficiency in commercial buildings by 2030, low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) targets which involve a 10% improvement in carbon intensity (vs. 2010 levels) by 2020 and an 18% improvement in carbon intensity by 2030 and a zero-emission vehicle requirement of 1.5 million vehicles by 2025 and 4.2 million vehicles by 2030.

### Quebec Specific Assumptions<sup>63</sup>

For Quebec, the emissions cap modeled in  $N_{ew}ERA$  was based on a 2030 GHG target of 37.5% below 1990 levels with the emissions cap assumed to decline towards zero to attain carbon neutrality by 2050. Offset credits that could be used to satisfy compliance obligations were specified as fixed percentages of the annual emissions cap.<sup>64</sup>

A total of 4% of the annual emissions cap set were aside in an APCR. Since the  $N_{ew}ERA$  model does not explicitly include Quebec as a separate region, reductions that could be attained from the non-electric sector in Quebec were modeled through a marginal abatement cost curve (MAC) which specify different abatement quantities and associated carbon prices. The MAC curve for Quebec was developed by comparing its non-electric emissions intensity with those of U.S. states. The N<sub>ew</sub>ERA model was then run for those U.S. states whose non-electric emissions intensity matched most closely with that in Quebec using different carbon prices imposed on the non-electric sectors to obtain the associated quantity of emissions abatement. No reductions were assumed to come from the electric sector.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> "Technical Overview", Quebec cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emission allowances (C&T) (available at <u>https://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/documents-spede/technical-overview.pdf</u>); Canada – Quebec Cap-and-Trade Program," ETS Detailed Information, International Carbon Action Partnership, Last Updated: 12 April 2021 (available at the second sec

 $<sup>\</sup>underline{https://icapcarbonaction.com/en/?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%5D=73).$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Up to 8% of each entity's compliance obligation.



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