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TCEQ's attempt to create a helpful list of Best Management Practices for Aggregate Production Operations is an exercise in willful blindness. It completely ignores issues mandated by the legislature, as well as others that reduce water quality and increase flood risk.

The issues you do address are addressed in a vague and/or self-evident manner that render them inadequate.

In addition to more specificity, I would like to see BMPs that help mines in the Houston region avoid inundation and pit capture.

Most mines on the East and West Forks of the San Jacinto were inundated last year. Floodwaters swept industrial waste downstream into Lake Houston, the drinking water supply for two million people.

The rivers also broke through the dikes of at least six of those mines. The rivers now run through pits instead of around them. This flushes sand and sediment downstream, where it reduces conveyance, blocks drainage and contributes to flooding.

Addressing these issues requires building mines on higher ground, farther from rivers.

I recommend doubling the minimum setback from 100 to 200 feet for mines in the San Jacinto watershed. That will put the mines on higher ground, farther from the floodway.

I also recommend leaving forests undisturbed in the widened buffer zone. That will reduce the velocity of floodwater and, with it, the volume of sediment carried downstream. It will also decrease the likelihood of pit capture, by increasing the amount of time that it takes a river to migrate into a mine. The forest will also help capture sediment that may escape a mine.

Finally, the wider buffers will give rivers more room to spread out during floods. Right now, dikes are supposed to protect mines from a hundred-year flood. But when mines build tall dikes on one side of a river, they double the volume of water flooding the other side. And when they build tall dikes on both sides of a river, water has no room to spread out without invading the mines. The tall dikes effectively eliminate ALL floodplains and turn rivers into erosive firehoses.

The attached PDF shows visual proof of the need for BMPs that address our main sand-mining concerns in the San Jacinto Watershed.

I also support the concerns and list of alternative BMPs supported by Texans for Responsible Aggregate Mining.

***Sediment Pollution from Sand Mining:
Impact on Flood Risk, Costs, Water Quality***

Appendix to APO BMP List Proposal

Dredging costs for the City of Houston and Army Corps approached \$200 million dollars in the five years leading up to October 2023. That's \$40 million per year. Better BMPs for APOs would likely have reduced or delayed that expenditure of public funds.

Lake Houston Dredging Operation SUMMARY					
Dredging Project	Agency	Funding Source	Material Dredged (CY)	Cost (in millions)	Timeline
West Fork	USACE	FEMA-PA	1,849,000	\$73.7	9/2018 – 6/2019
West Fork	USACE	FEMA-PA	500,000	17.1	6/2019-1/2020
Mouth Bar	CITY OF HOUSTON	GOVERNOR GRANT/TWDB-HC GRANT	442,976	16.6	1/2020-5/2020 & 6/2020-12/2020
Mouth Bar North	CITY OF HOUSTON	TWDB- HC GRANT	175,895	6.6	12/2020-6/2021
West Fork	CITY OF HOUSTON	TWDB-HC GRANT	36,137	18	6/2021-11/2021
West Fork	CITY OF HOUSTON	FEMA-PA	876,672 (est)	34 (est)	11/2023-11/2025
Lake Houston	CITY OF HOUSTON	TWDB-COH GRANT	ongoing	20	10/2022-ongoing
TOTALS			3,880,680	\$186	

At an October 2023 town hall meeting in Kingwood, Houston Mayor Pro Tem Dave Martin presented this summary showing dredging costs totaling \$186 million.

But those costs paled in comparison to more than a billion dollars in damages to 13,000 homes and businesses that flooded in the Lake Houston Area during Hurricane Harvey. They flooded behind giant sand bars that formed sediment dams at the mouths of the [East](#) and [West Forks](#) of the San Jacinto.

Nor do those costs reflect extra water filtration at the City's Northeast Water Purification plant.

To be fair, nature causes some erosion. The question is whether local mining practices accelerate it. See the pictures below that show sediment discharges related to pit capture and frequent flooding in sand mines.



*Confluence of San Jacinto West Fork (right) and Spring Creek near US59 Bridge.
This is a frequent sight. Twenty square miles of mines are upstream on the right
in a 20-mile reach of the river.*



San Jacinto East Fork capturing a mine in Plum Grove.



Effluent from the Hallett settling pond on San Jacinto West Fork escaping into adjacent property owned by others.



Close up of same effluent from same pond shows source of leakage.



Dike of abandoned Williams Brothers Mine (upper right) eroded by the San Jacinto West Fork (lower left).

In the next flood, about three months later...



... Hurricane Beryl eroded what was left of the wall and flowed through the pit.

A little upstream, Hallett sold a sand pit (below left) on the San Jacinto West Fork to a real estate developer, Riverwalk Porter LLC. Within months, the river captured the pit.



The West Fork now flows into the pit at the north end...



...and flows out at the south end.



Wider shot of same pit (to the right of the S-turn) shows both the entry breach (lower right) and exit breach (upper right) in the dikes.

Miners claim their pits actually capture sand and keep it from floating downstream. That may be true at certain times during a flood, for instance, as it recedes. However, at the peak of the May 2024 flood, the speed of floodwater was sufficient to entrain sand in pits and carry it downstream.



A drone followed logs floating through this captured West Fork pit at 5 MPH.

5 MPH is more than fast enough to scoop up and carry off the largest grains of sand and other sediment.

See Hjulström curve below.



Industry-standard graph shows the speed necessary to erode, transport and deposit sand/sediment of different particle sizes. *Blue line* indicates **measured** speed of water. *Red* indicates range of typical sand sizes. Speed was greater than necessary to erode and transport all sand sizes, and even some gravel.



Another West Fork pit capture at the Hallett Mine after floodwaters receded. Notice how natural channel of the river has been virtually cut off.



Effluent from the Hallett Mine (upstream in upper right) polluting the West Fork at the Northpark/Oakhurst Ditch (middle foreground). Water flows right to left. Facing West.



Reverse angle (facing east) shows proximity of pollution to homes in Northpark Woods subdivision. That's the Oakhurst Ditch, which empties into the West Fork behind camera position. Water flows left to right. Hallett mine is upstream on left.



Same ditch blocked by sand increases flood risk for homes (visible in top right).



Farther downstream, the Kingwood Diversion Ditch (top middle) also became blocked by sediment. A Harris County Flood Control District study found that the [Diversion Ditch was one of the two most dangerous flooding problems](#) in Kingwood.

The entrance to this ditch had just recently been dredged by the Army Corps.



Broken dike at the Triple PG sand mine in Porter. Industrial wastewater is flowing out of the mine into White Oak Creek which joins Caney Creek and the San Jacinto East Fork before flowing into Lake Houston.

These pictures demonstrate that flooding of sand mines is a huge environmental problem in the Lake Houston Area. We have industrial waste increasing flood risk and polluting the drinking water supply for 2 million people. And the TCEQ BMPs don't even address the problem.

Conclusion: Mines need to be positioned farther from rivers on higher ground. Natural vegetation needs to be left in the buffer zones to slow floodwaters and reduce erosion. The measures could help solve the problems shown above and help protect the health and safety of millions of people.

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